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ABSTRACT 
What depth of learning can policy appraisal stimulate? How we can account for the 
survival policies that are known to pose significant countervailing risks? While 
heralded as a panacea to the inherent ambiguity of the political world, the 
proposition pursued is that policy appraisal processes intended to help decision-
makers learn may actually be counterproductive. Rather than simulating policy-
oriented learning, appraisals may reduce policy actors’ capacity to think clearly 
about the policy at hand. By encouraging a variety of epistemic inputs from a 
plurality of sources and shoehorning knowledge development into a specified 
timeframe, policy appraisal may leave decision-makers overloaded with conflicting 
information and evidence which dates rapidly. In such circumstances, they to fall 
back on institutionalised ways of thinking even when confronted with evidence of 
significant mismatches between policy objectives and the consequences of the planned 
course of action. Here learning is ‘single-loop’ rather than ‘double-loop’ – focussed 
on adjustments in policy strategy rather than re-thinking the underlying policy goals. 
Using insights from new institutional economics (NIE), the paper explores how the 
results of policy appraisals in technically complex issues are mediated by 
institutionalised ‘rules of the game’ which feed back positively around initial policy 
frames and early interpretations of what constitutes policy success. Empirical 
evidence from UK biofuels policy appraisal confirms the usefulness of accounts that 
attend to the temporal tensions that exist between policy and knowledge development. 
Adopting an institutional approach that emphasises path dependence does not 
however preclude the possibility that the depth of decision-makers’ learning might 
change. Rather, the biofuels case suggests that moves toward deeper learning may be 
affected by reviews of appraisal evidence led by actors beyond immediate 
organizational context with Chief Scientific Advisers (CSAs) within government 
emerging as potentially powerful catalysts in this acquisition of learning capabilities. 
 
Keywords: biofuels; Chief Scientific Advisers; learning; new institutional economics; 
policy appraisal; positive feedback; time. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Policy appraisal processes have become an established part of the policy making 
landscape. Research is commissioned, stakeholders consulted and policy impacts 
assessed with the various aims of protecting the environment, making ‘better’ 
regulation and mainstreaming a neo-liberal approach to policy (Turnpenny et al, 2009: 
640). Such ex ante analysis is especially likely in knowledge-dense or technically 
complex policy problems, where decision-makers’ experience sizeable knowledge 
deficits and struggle to predict the consequences of their activities. So far, the 
growing academic interest in appraisal has focussed on categorising analytical tools 
and procedures, explaining their diffusion, use and non-use (Nilsson et al, 2008; 
Radaelli, 2004, 2005; Turnpenny et al, 2008, 2009). A key strand of consensus that 
has developed is that the gap between the rational-analytic promise of policy appraisal 
and reality of the ‘policy mess’ results in significant barriers to decision-makers’ 
learning (Hertin et al, 2009). This paper aims to expand on this finding by exploring 
how and if appraisal makes institutions think differently (Radaelli, 2007) and, 
specifically, the depth of learning that policy appraisal engenders and how we can 
account for the survival policies known to pose significant countervailing risks. 
 
Rather than add to the rational-analytical accounts of appraisal use that dominate the 
nascent literature, the institutional context of policy appraisal is explored with a view 
to getting under the skin of the ‘policy and politics’ of policy appraisal (Turnpenny et 
al, 2009: 640). Specifically, the paper goes beyond the conventional consideration that 
‘institutions matter’ and uses path dependence analysis to explore a specific 
proposition; policy appraisal processes, which are designed to help decision-makers 
think and learn, may actually reinforce limited learning forms in government. The 
discussion rests on the assertion that a lack of synchronicity exists between making 
and delivering policy to a political timetable on the one hand and producing 
knowledge that is robust and clear enough to guide policymakers on the other. The 
proposition advanced here is that, in issue areas marked by policy urgency and 
technical complexity, this temporal disjuncture can result in an array of evidence and 
signals about potentially countervailing risks that decision-makers are unable to weigh 
and navigate, in the time they have. In such circumstances, we can expect decision-
makers to fall back on early policy frames and institutionalised ways of thinking. The 
information produced by appraisal will be heavily filtered by institutional processes 
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associated with the evolution of the technologies in question; the rules and hierarchy 
in political life, and the norms that inform political actors’ internal representations of 
issues. These forces impact upon the depth of learning that is possible and, in 
particular, reinforce the tendency toward limited forms of organizational learning 
already present in the political world. 
 
The first section of the paper sets out the proposition. Here, what is being explained – 
organizational learning – is outlined using Argyris and Schön’s (1974, 1978) seminal 
model. Their account, which contrasts shallow ‘single-loop’ learning with deep 
‘double-loop’ learning, is used as the basis for scoping out the dependent variable – 
the learning form associated with policy appraisal. Three temporal challenges that 
underpin the policy-knowledge development interface are then outlined and related to 
the two learning types. Drawing on institutional analysis from new institutional 
economics (NIE), the paper explores how the results of policy appraisals in 
technically complex issues are mediated by institutions. Specifically, the ‘rules of the 
game’ – that are constructed and reproduced to ensure stable and predictable political 
interactions (North, 1990, 1994; Pierson, 2004). Using the NIE conceptualisation, 
section two of the paper explores how policy appraisal evidence that both supports 
and undermines a policy goal can be filtered through four positive feedback processes 
familiar to NIE analysis: large set-up costs; learning by doing; coordination effects 
and adaptive expectations (Arthur, 1988). Empirically, this is applied to UK biofuels 
policy, and specifically the interpretation of policy appraisal evidence that emerged in 
the development of the Renewable Transport Fuel Obligation (RTFO) between 2004 
and 2008. The paper concludes by summarising the findings and reflecting on the 
wider significance of the characteristics of positive feedback on the depth learning 
that policy appraisal can generate, and the measures that can be taken within 
government to disrupt these forces of inertia. 
 
While the paper offers some early evidence on state responses to climate change in 
general and biofuels in the UK in particular, this case study illustrates the learning 
challenges decision-makers face when policy appraisal processes produce evidence of 
anomalies between the stated goals of policy and its potential consequences. In this 
way, the case is treated as illustrative of the high level of complexity and temporal 
pressures that increasingly confront decision-makers attempting to engage, not only 
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with technologies to address sustainable development, but knowledge-dense issues 
more generally. 
 
The major limitation of the account is that when analysing a ‘live’ issue not all 
learning can be captured, and so hard results are necessarily limited. What learning 
gets left out? It is not only policy analysts who produce appraisals, and the decision-
makers attempting to decipher the resulting evidence, who face temporal challenges. 
Learning processes have their own temporal dimension – with enlightenment and 
policy oriented learning happening over protracted periods of time (Sabatier, 1988; 
Weiss, 1979). Research asking what depth of learning appraisal has stimulated is itself 
looking at the ‘snapshot’ rather than the moving picture (Turnpenny et al, 2009: 468). 
 
 
SECTION 1 THE PROPOSITION: POLICY APPRAISAL, THE RULES OF 
THE GAME AND SINGLE-LOOP LEARNING 
1.1. Single and Double-Loop Learning in Complex Organizations 
Before we explore the type of learning that policy appraisals can stimulate, we first 
need to outline key forms of organizational learning more generally. What sort of 
learning is possible within government? Arguably the most influential work on 
learning in complex organizations is that of Argyris and Schön (1974, 1978). All 
organizational life is marked by a paradox – the pressure for stability and 
predictability on the one hand and the necessity for change on the other. In complex 
multi-level, multi-layered settings, this paradox creates tensions in how decision-
makers deal with situations, where something is predicted to go wrong, or, there is the 
potential for damaging countervailing risks that are difficult to resolve. This focus on 
complexity and definition of learning as the detection and correction of error makes 
Argyris and Schön’s thesis, that distinguishes two depths of learning, a good fit with 
analysis of what government learns from policy appraisal. 
 
Action in organizations is encapsulated by the idea of ‘theories-in-use’ which are 
comprised of three linked components (Argyris and Schön, 1974, 1978). These can be 
described and related to policy action in this way: 
• governing variables which represent the objective or policy goal to be 
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• action strategies that are comprised of the policy instruments and tools 
deployed to deliver those objectives, and 
• consequences, both intended and unintended, that result from the goals set and 
action taken to reach them. 
When the consequences match the policy goal, an organization’s theory-in-use is 
confirmed. Where there is a mismatch between intention and outcome, one of two 
learning types is triggered in response – single-loop or double-loop. The difference 
between single and double-loop learning can be captured in the neat shorthand of 
‘doing things better’ versus ‘doing things differently’ (Hayes and Allinson, 1998). 
Organizations that first look for another action strategy, with which to achieve their 
goals, are engaged in single-loop learning. Such learning is thermostatic – based on 
adjustment rather fundamental change. This constrained character has lead some 
scholars to argue that when they engage in single-loop policy adjustment, decision-
makers are not actually learning at all (Haas, 1990: chapter 1). In double-loop 
learning by contrast, the frames and norms that underpin policy goals are 
problematized and often disrupted. Double-loop learning is expansive; it requires a 
willingness to question the appropriateness of goals and ‘revalue’ them (Haas, 1990: 
24). Figure one offers a simple illustration of the two learning types. 
 
Figure 1: Theories-in-Use and Single and Double-Loop Learning 
 
Source: Smith, 2001. 
 
 
How does this thesis relate to decision-makers’ context? The political world is not 
efficient in the way the economic sphere aims to be; rather the complexity of the tasks 
outstrip humans’ information-processing capacities (Simon, 1957). This opacity, and 
the cognitive limitations experienced by decision-makers, make it particularly prone 
to single-loop learning (Lindblom, 1959; North, 1990, 1994; Pierson, 2000, 2004; 
action 
strategy 
governing 
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consequences 
Double-loop learning 
Single-loop learning 
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Simon, 1957). Issues have multiple linkages, the presence and consequences of which 
are often unclear and difficult to calculate in a time frame that is politically tenable. 
Even where a problem is easy to diagnose, solutions can be difficult to identify and 
develop – decision-makers do not have an endless supply of ‘plan Bs’ at their disposal 
(Allison, 1971). Decision-makers aim to reduce uncertainty in the short-term, and as a 
result may downplay the significance of dissonant information resulting from policy 
appraisals, preferring to argue that the benefits outweigh the drawbacks until proven 
otherwise. 
 
While Argyris and Schön’s is a prescriptive account, where double-loop learning 
should be the goal for every organisation, it is worth noting that no such assumption is 
followed here. In politics, there are many conceptions of what makes ‘good’ policy, 
‘what works’ and constitutes ‘policy success’ (Lindblom, 1959; Marsh and 
McConnell, 2008; Parsons, 2004) – ranging from the rational-analytic view that 
underpins double-loop learning to highly politicised definitions where power and 
material interests displace learning. More usually, the political world tends toward 
adaptive behaviour. To establish themselves as credible and legitimate actors, 
decision-makers engage in patterns of behaviour and construct institutions that 
emphasise stability and predictability. A world of double-loop learning, in which 
goals and underlying assumptions are readily and publicly questioned, is one of low 
trust and instability rather than calm continuity. Institutions offer a way to avoid such 
uncertainty, by reproducing and reinforcing existing policies and power structures. 
There is also evidence that adaptive learning is actually advantageous in particular 
issues – notably, complex and chronic problems where knowledge is evolving and 
inconclusive (Gunderson and Light, 2006). 
 
1.2. The Research Question 
What depth of learning can policy appraisal stimulate? Policy appraisal tools and 
processes are intended to help decision-makers learn and institutions think (Owens et 
al, 2004; Turnpenny et al, 2009). They exist both as a panacea to the inherent 
ambiguity of the political world described above and as a source of authoritative 
justification for the policy changes that may be undesirable otherwise. Can policy 
appraisal processes counter the single-loop tendencies of the political world? To 
understand the types of learning that policy appraisal can stimulate we need to 
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understand the limits within which policy appraisal operates. The proposition is that 
where policy problems are urgent and potential solutions involve complex technology 
and an emerging evidence base, policy appraisal processes may not encourage deep 
learning. Specifically, it is argued there are three temporal challenges associated with 
policy appraisal processes that reduce decision-makers capacity to engage with 
evidence – especially on countervailing risks – and exacerbate the tendency toward 
single-loop, adaptive behaviours. 
 
The first challenge is the reality that policy appraisals may help shape and justify 
policy goals, but they do not precede them. While appraisal happens ‘upstream’ in the 
policy process, policy goals are often well-established by the time reports have been 
commissioned, consultations started and analysis of evidence begun. This is 
especially likely in multi-level decision-making structures or situations where a policy 
problem and its potential solutions are technically complicated (Dunlop, 2007, 2009; 
Dunlop and James, 2007). Where policy is being constructed in a context of 
complexity and uncertainty, decision-makers may find themselves appraising policy 
options for delivering goals they cannot easily revisit or retract. The epistemic inputs 
that are most relevant to decision-makers are those which represent ‘useable 
knowledge’ (Haas, 2004; Lindblom and Cohen, 1979), which helps them refine policy 
strategy rather than those disruptive to overall policy objectives. In such 
circumstances, there may be a high potential for anomalies and inefficiencies in 
policies to persist, even where they are detected by appraisal because decision-makers 
lack the scope to reflect on them. 
 
The second challenge concerns the different standards that underpin knowledge 
creation and policy development. For the former it is wide validation and epistemic 
consensus, and, for the latter the delivery of political preferences is commonly the 
primary goal. These contrasting motivations mean that the timetables that govern 
knowledge creation and policy construction are distinct – with the former being more 
protracted and open-ended than the latter. Policy appraisal is an artificial construct 
which aims to bridge this temporal gap and offer a compromise that can result in an 
evidence-base for policy. In policy appraisal, evidence is produced against the clock. 
To catch decision-makers’ attention, and warrant further consideration, it needs to 
exist in a digestible and clear form before policy has been implemented. However, the 
 8 
arrival of a scientific consensus will not always coincide with the policy timetable. 
Binding the evidential production of evidence to the timetable of policy development 
timetables reduces the certainty of what is produced, because its scope is necessarily 
restricted to making predictions at one particular juncture about what the impacts of 
policy might be. The tendency is toward capturing the ‘snapshot’ as opposed to the 
‘moving picture’ (Pierson, 1996), with policy appraisal processes conflicting with the 
cumulative character of knowledge production (Kuhn, 1962). And so, any 
synchronicity between appraisal and epistemic consensus becomes a matter of chance 
not design. In this view, the snapshots produced by appraisal processes may offer few 
clues as to how different aspects of knowledge fit together, leaving the form or even 
existence of a bigger picture unclear. Such de-contextualisation may lead decision-
makers to dismiss as conjectural early indicators of problems which are substantiated 
later. 
 
The third temporal challenge found at the policy-knowledge interface concerns 
information overload. The policy legitimation function served by appraisal ensures a 
plurality of evidential inputs; however, the restricted length of time that exists for the 
interpretation of these inputs can leave decision-makers overloaded with evidence 
about a huge array of potential countervailing risks that might be triggered by the 
policy they are developing (Graham and Weiner, 1995). This creates validation 
difficulties in knowing what weight to attach to a piece of evidence, thus increasing, 
rather than reducing, uncertainty about the costs of certain courses of action. Such 
uncertainty, in turn, reinforces existing patterns of thinking and initial policy frames 
and, in doing so, exacerbates the political tendency toward single-loop learning. In 
this way, by addressing one capacity problem – the much discussed lack of 
information available to decision-makers (see Turnpenny et al 2009 on ‘type 2’ 
research on policy appraisal) – policy appraisal processes, and the temporal limits 
they place on knowledge development, can actually give rise to others notably too 
much evidence to sift in too little time. In short, policy appraisal processes may 
increase not decrease uncertainty and complexity in decision-making, ‘endarkening’ 
rather than enlightening (Weiss, 1979: 430). 
 
1.3. The Analytical Framework: Explaining the Impact of Policy Appraisal 
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How can we explain the impact of policy appraisal in knowledge-dense policy 
dilemmas? The temporal tension that lies at the heart of policy appraisal, between 
knowledge production and policy development, increases the importance of existing 
institutionalised ‘rules of the game’. We know that when faced with a wide range of 
conflicting signals, and complex or incomplete information, decision-makers rely on 
existing modus operandi and habits of thinking to simplify, interpret and weigh 
evidence about the potential impact of a policy. North conceptualises these formal 
procedures and informal norms and understandings as ‘humanly devised constraints 
that shape human interactions’ (1990: 3). The second aspect of the proposition 
explored here involves explaining how the evidence yielded by appraisals is 
interpreted in knowledge-dense policy problems. This is done using the insights from 
new institutional economics (NIE) (Arthur, 1994; North, 1990), and its extensions in 
political analysis (Pierson, 2004). Specifically, the mediating influence of three 
aspects of these rules is explored. 
 
First, they encapsulate the tendency in complex, knowledge-intensive sectors for 
particular technological ‘solutions’ to gain an early advantage and become locked-in 
even where they are found to be sub-optimal (Arthur, 1994; David, 1985; Romer, 
1986, 1990). In the evolution of technologies, small events may exert 
disproportionately large and long-lasting effects (Arthur, 1988). So, for example, 
where a technology appears to offer the main answer to an urgent problem or fill a 
profitable gap in the market, economic, political and cognitive resources that are 
invested in its development ensure that it can persist even in the face of evidence of 
deleterious effects or inefficiency. Thus, having an early niche or ‘being fastest out of 
the gate’ can lead to ‘monopolistic domination’, and path dependence, as the costs of 
changing become prohibitive (North, 1990: 94). 
 
Second, this argument can be extended to institutional development around policies 
(North, 1990; Pierson, 2004). To navigate their way through complex policy 
problems, decision-makers create formal constraints – systemic structures, rules and 
procedures – that enhance stability, and deliberately bind them (and their successors) 
to particular policy goals. This encourages continuity, and enhances predictability in 
the uncertain political world. Over time, the institutions and policies which embody 
these rules become resistant to fundamental change as they become reinforced by 
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organizations and interest groups with an interest in keeping the existing constraints 
(North, 1990: 99). We should be careful to distinguish between policies and the policy 
appraisal of them. Policies concern the goals and tools that have been used to signal to 
actors about what is to be achieved and how (Pierson, 2004; Pierson and Skocpol, 
2002). The incentives and opportunity structures that flow from them often precede 
any role for policy appraisal. 
 
These rules, and the power asymmetries and opportunity structures they give rise to, 
both reflect and reinforce norms and cognitive frames that dominate thinking around 
an issue, and provide policymakers with ‘mental maps’ (Argyris and Schön, 1974; 
Denzau and North, 1994) about what is technically, systemically and politically 
feasible and desirable. These maps, that are often based on based on first impressions 
(Mannheim, 1952), represent important tools for intendedly rational decision-makers 
to navigate ambiguous political and technological terrain (Denzau and North, 1994; 
Simon, 1957). These subjective constructions of the contribution made by a particular 
technology to the resolution of a problem, and how to harness that solution 
procedurally, represent the third component of the rules of the game. It is difficult to 
convince decision-makers that these cognitive shortcuts may no longer be valid, 
because these ways of thinking both pre-date, and inform, the construction of formal 
procedures and technology selection (in a process akin to the idea of ‘sedimentation’ 
[Tolbert and Zucker, 1996]). Even where a policy initiative is new or novel, aspects of 
the rules of the game that surround it will be well-established in layers of underlying 
values and understandings. 
 
The array of new and conflicting information yielded by policy appraisal, about the 
consequences of a course of action, is filtered through this ‘institutional matrix’ of 
inter-dependent technical, procedural and cognitive constraints (North, 1990: 95). 
Significantly, as actors commit to them, these rules generate self-reinforcing activity 
(Arthur, 1994) creating an inertial tendency towards initial policy choices and frames; 
‘[T]he farther into a process we are, the harder it becomes to shift from one path to 
another’ (Arthur, 1994 in Pierson, 2004: 18). Thus, the positive feedback created by 
institutional rules and routines creates homeostasis and inflexibility. Events, mindsets 
and decisions that happen early in policy development – i.e. as the issue is being 
framed – exert a disproportionately largely influence (Pierson, 2000). The importance 
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of this bias, toward starting points and initial policy frames, reinforces the problem 
that policy appraisal often comes too late in the sequence of policy development, and 
casts doubt on whether appraisal alone could ever enable deep, double-loop learning. 
 
We should be clear about the type of learning that is possible in an environment of 
self-reinforcing investment, rules and beliefs. The argument is not that these rules of 
the game prevent learning, and ensure the preservation of the status quo. Path 
dependence does not mean that, once set, policy paths are inevitable and 
unchangeable. Organizational learning does result from the new information yielded 
from policy appraisals but, most commonly, such learning takes an adaptive form 
with institutions attempting to correct previous dysfunctional decisions by making 
amendments at the margins (Cheung, 1996; Crozier, 1962; Kreuger, 1996; March and 
Simon, 1957). Indeed, in extreme cases, where corrective measures are not taken, the 
institution itself may cease to exist (Genschel, 1997). But, the cumulative logic of the 
rules of the game, places limits on decision-makers’ interpretations narrowing the 
political and economic choices they draw from appraisal resulting in policy 
adaptations which are usually, but not always, derivative (North, 1990: 94-95; 
Pierson, 1996). 
 
1. 4. The Research Method: Scoping Single and Double-Loop Learning 
How can we scope our dependent variable, and capture the learning that results from 
appraisal? At its simplest, the absence or presence of single or double-loop learning is 
identified in terms of how decision-makers respond to information that predicts a 
mismatch between goals and consequences. Where strategies are adapted, but 
underlying goals defended, single-loop learning has occurred, where underlying goals 
are challenged and, in extreme cases, actually changed it is double-loop. This needs to 
be nuanced a little further however. Decision-makers’ learning across the course of 
policy appraisal is dynamic not static – narrow understandings may widen over time 
as knowledge develops. While this may not result in a switch from single to double-
loop learning, learning over time may change their propensity and ability to engage in 
deeper learning. This issue of the extent to which double-loop learning could take 
place needs to be scoped out. 
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Argyris and Schön (1978) differentiate two models that describe the manner in which 
learning is approached. Of specific interest here are the underlying values and 
indicators of theories-in-use that either inhibit or enhance the possibility of double-
loop learning (Argyris and Schön, 1978). Model I inhibits double-loop learning. Here, 
responses to new and dissonant information are defensive. Actors deploy strategies 
that control the environment and discourage in-depth or external testing of ideas. 
Model II enhances the possibility of double-loop learning. It involves engagement in 
‘abnormal discourse’ (Rorty, 1979) and exploration in the inquiry, design and 
implementation of corrective action. The indicators, elaborated by Argyris and Schön 
and those using their thesis (summarised in table 1), allow us to track the learning 
associated with policy appraisal across time. Specifically, they illuminate the extent to 
which the single-loop learning, most associated with policy appraisal, is the type that 
encourages or discourages deeper learning. 
 
Table 1: The Manner of Learning: Governing Values and Indicators Associated 
with Theories-in-Use that Inhibit and Enhance Double-Loop Learning 
Association 
with double-
loop learning 
Governing values Indicators 
Model I 
inhibits 
double-loop 
learning 
1. achieve purpose 
2. inconsistencies 
perceived in ‘win, 
don’t lose’ terms 
3. rationalise 
contrary evidence 
1. low level public testing of ideas 
2. error correction in a manner that 
does not threaten the underlying 
norms 
3. where errors cannot be 
camouflaged they will be 
corrected, unless this clashes 
with underlying norms 
Model II 
enhances 
likelihood of 
double-loop 
learning 
1. valid information 
2. free and informed 
choice 
3. internal 
commitment to 
change 
1. inquiry that conceals agents 
views 
2. wide participation in inquiry, 
design and implementation of 
corrective action 
Source: Argyris and Schön, 1978; Argyris et al, 1985: 89-97; Anderson, 1997; Edmondson and 
Moingeon, 1999. 
 
 
SECTION 2 THE RULES OF THE GAME AND POLICY APPRAISAL – 
POSITIVE FEEDBACK, SINGLE-LOOP LEARNING AND BIOFUELS 
POLICY IN THE UK 
The proposition that policy appraisal evidence in complex issues tends to produce 
single-loop learning policy requires empirical exploration. Specifically, the extent to 
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which policy appraisal processes are mediated by technical, economic and systemic 
factors endogenous to issues and institutions, and the cognitive biases and ‘mental 
maps’ they produce, exert positive feedback is explored through an examination of 
biofuels policy development in the UK. Learning is explored in terms of individual 
decision-makers in government departments, as well as scientists and stakeholders 
involved in the policy process (see Etheridge, 1981, 1985 and Levy, 1994 for a 
similar micro-level approach where governmental learning is equated with the sum of 
what and how individuals learn). Analysis follows a ‘process-tracing’ approach 
(Berman, 2001; George, 1997), with actors’ perceptions of how the ‘rules of the 
game’ around biofuels influenced what was learned from policy appraisal outputs 
identified through interviews with key actors
1
. When they are asked how they address 
a mismatch between goals and (predicted) outcomes, members of organizations are 
prone to rationalise their behaviour (Argyris and Schön, 1974: 6-7). To avoid such 
espoused accounts, interviews and analysis used the indicators outlined earlier to 
guide questioning. This is accompanied by analysis of documentary evidence – policy 
appraisal documentation, predominately scientific reports, parliamentary enquiries, 
legislation, internal reports and government publications. 
 
Analysis of the case makes an empirical contribution to our limited knowledge of the 
challenges decision-makers face in trying to develop policy in circumstances where 
new and often conjectural information, about the deleterious effects of a favoured 
course of action, is emerging after the policy goals have been set and delivery 
instruments selected. We know how government would ideally like to narrow the gap 
between policy and epistemic timetables – a plethora of guidance exists about 
learning technologies such as horizon scanning, scenario planning, stakeholder 
consultation and impact assessment. We know less about how decision-makers keep 
pace with, verify, weigh and respond to unclear, unanticipated or unexpectedly strong 
signals that arise from these appraisal processes. 
 
Biofuels have been heralded as offering solutions to various global problems – energy 
insecurity, rural poverty and, most notably, climate change – and generous subsidies 
                                                 
1 Semi-structured interviews have been conducted with civil servants – in the Department for Transport (DfT) and Department 
for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) – government scientific advisers, industry officials, politicians and 
environmentalists. This evidence was bolstered by written and oral evidence given by 56 decision-makers and stakeholders 
involved in the RTFO to the Environmental Audit Committee in October and November 2007 (EAC, 2008). 
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have been deployed by governments across the world to stimulate their production. In 
April 2008, the Renewable Transport Fuel Obligation
2
 (RTFO) came into force in the 
UK. This requires that biofuels make up 2.5% by volume of road transport fuel sales, 
increasing by 1.25% a year to 5% by 2010/11. Amid concerns about the carbon 
savings yielded by biofuels, and their potentially deleterious impact on sustainability, 
the RTFO requires that transport fuel suppliers report on the environmental 
performance of their biofuels. 
 
The RTFO was the result of four years of policy development where appraisal was 
extensive. This exploration can be divided into two distinct phases. The first covers 
the period between 2004 and 2007, when policy was being developed by the 
Department for Transport (DfT). Here appraisal (predominately, commissioned 
reports, stakeholder consultations and impact assessments) focussed on the direct 
effects of increased biofuels production, where the estimated GHG emissions 
reductions and implications for land use change (LUC) were particular concerns. 
Rather than explaining the fundamental policy goal to increase biofuel production and 
use, the DfT used the evidence to develop detailed policy strategy. The policy goal 
had been set in the 2003 EU Biofuels Directive (2003/30/EC), leaving member states 
researching and consulting on: the selection and design of the specific mechanism 
deployed to encourage industry (RTFO) (DfT, 2004: 7); what targets should be set 
and when (DfT, 2004: 4); public labeling (DfT, 2004: s8), and best practice in relation 
to sustainability criteria (DfT, 2004: s7.5). However, while appraisal focused on 
developing policy instruments, it is important to be clear that throughout the 
appraisals, decision-makers were aware that increased biofuel production raised 
potentially significant and environmentally deleterious countervailing risks. The 
thorny questions that exist about the level and costs of CO2 emissions reductions they 
yield were well known (for an example of an early intervention see the European 
Environmental Bureau’s [EEB] 2002 statement). By 2007, these concerns intensified 
with appraisal inputs becoming more numerous from both within government 
(notably, responses to the Department for Transport consultations rose from 129 in 
the first consultation in 2004 to 6,335 in the 2007 exercise) (DfT, 2004, 2007) and 
beyond it where interventions, particularly on indirect effects like food price rises and 
                                                 
2 The Renewable Transport Fuel Obligation Order 2007, No. 3072, October 25th. 
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the displacement of agriculture onto uncultivated land, from NGOs, academics, 
journalists and international agencies came thick and fast. Decision-makers struggled 
to know both how to process the often inconsistent and conjectural evidence and the 
weight to attach to the risks being signaled. As an emerging technology, the evidence 
on the magnitude of biofuels’ unintended effects (both direct and indirect), and the 
carbon abatement costs associated with them, was nebulous and conflicting signals 
were abundant. Thus, in the manner described earlier, decisions about detailed aspects 
of the design of biofuels policy were being made ahead of the production of concrete 
substantive knowledge about the consequences of the overall policy goal. 
 
Questions and evidence relating to the countervailing risks implied by biofuels, 
especially their indirect effects on staple food supplies and prices and deforestation, 
gathered and gained widespread international attention in the run-up to the RTFO’s 
implementation. This led to calls for a review, and in some cases a moratorium, on all 
policies aimed at increasing the use of biofuels
3
 (EAC, 2008). Aware that the science 
had started to move very quickly, and was more than the DfT could assess, the 
government’s Chief Scientific Adviser and Chief Scientific Advisers (CSAs) of the 
DfT and the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs’ (DEFRA) Chief 
Scientific Adviser intervened, advising Ministers of the need to take stock and get 
advice from outside the circle of government (Bob Watson interview; RTFO 
Programme Director interview; LCVP Director interview). Particularly pivotal was 
the public declaration of Professor Bob Watson – the DEFRA CSA and former 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) chair – that the policy should be 
examined very carefully before any implementation: ‘it is absolutely ridiculous to 
have a policy that causes further problems’ (BBC, 2008a, see also 2008b). 
 
While it did not suspend implementation in April 2008, in the February the DfT 
commissioned a review of the evidence chaired by Professor Ed Gallagher, the Chair 
of the Renewable Fuels Agency (RFA) (the independent agency created to implement 
the RTFO). The Gallagher Review represented the second phase of appraisal, though 
with the policy already being implemented this was more post factum than ex ante. 
Prepared in rapid response mode – it was commissioned in late February, reported to 
                                                 
3 Perhaps most notable were the concerns raised among government Ministers when the paper by Searchinger et al was published 
in Science in February 2008 argued that US biofuels production caused land-use change leading to increased net greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions. 
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government in May and published in July 2008. Gallagher focussed-in on six 
questions associated with the controversial and conjectural evidence on indirect 
effects by interviewing key scholars, commissioning technical reports and holding 
stakeholder workshops (RFA, 2008). The overall findings – which were reviewed and 
commented on by officials at the DfT, DEFRA and Cabinet Office and the relevant 
CSAs – were entirely supportive of the policy objective to increase biofuels use and 
production: ‘there is a future for a sustainable biofuels industry’ (RFA, 2008). Its 
recommendations were focused around adaptation of existing strategy, rather than any 
overhaul of the main policy objective. The three most significant recommendations 
that were outlined by the Secretary of State for Transport in July 2008 concerned 
amending strategy: 
• government should slow down the rate of increase in the RTFO to 0.5% per 
annum so that the RTFO reaches 5% in 2013/14 rather than 2010/11 as 
planned, 
• until controls on land-use change were set and enforced internationally, the 
UK should press for the European Union’s (EU) 10% by 2020 target to be 
kept under regular review in the light of the emerging evidence, and 
• the sustainability criteria for biofuels being negotiated in the EU should 
address indirect, as well as direct, effects on land use (Kelly, 2008). 
While decision-makers’ responses, to both the RTFO appraisals and Gallagher 
Review, bore the hallmarks of single-loop learning, the manner of decision-makers’ 
learning in the second phase of appraisal can be distinguished from that of the first. 
Though government action post-Gallagher was limited to changes in policy strategy, 
given its previous firm stance against any slowdown in biofuels adoption, the changes 
were significant and suggest that more radical action could not be ruled out were more 
damning evidence to be presented in the future. Moreover, when commissioning 
Gallagher, the Minister had been clear that the question of a moratorium should be 
addressed even though it would be difficult to implement (DfT Senior Policy Officer 
interview; Bob Watson interview). Of course, the fact that the body conducting the 
review – the RFA – had been created to implement the RTFO made it unlikely that 
such drastic action would be recommended. However, giving public recognition to 
this, as one possible and plausible policy option, is an important step toward enhanced 
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learning. The third indicator suggestive of enhanced learning was that, by focussing 
on indirect effects, Gallagher crystallized for decision-makers that some aspects of 
biofuels impacts were intangible, and could not be rationalised within existing 
arrangements (Bob Watson interview). 
 
The empirical puzzle here concerns why the principles that underpinned the 
Renewable Transport Fuel Obligation (RTFO) were not challenged in the first phase 
of appraisal, despite the mounting evidence against increasing the use and production 
of biofuels. Why did the UK government decide to do things ‘better’ rather than do 
things ‘differently’? The biofuels case is now analysed through the four self-
reinforcing mechanisms identified by Arthur (1988) which dominate policy 
development, and pose substantial hurdles to the ability of policy appraisal evidence 
to trigger deep learning and policy change. 
 
2.1. Large Set-Up Costs 
Any new policy initiative entails start-up costs. Where these are substantial, decision-
makers have an immediate incentive to stand by that policy choice, even in the face of 
criticism and evidence of the significant countervailing risks to which it may give rise. 
The novelty and technical complexity of biofuels meant that the economic and 
institutional set-up costs associated with the RTFO were especially high, leaving 
evidence of countervailing risks interpreted in the ‘win don’t lose’ terms that inhibits 
double-loop learning. 
 
Decision-makers who believe in a policy goal often design it in a way that enables it 
to withstand challenge and makes it difficult to dismantle. Though the DfT did not 
present them as a ‘silver bullet’, decision-makers there consciously accentuated the 
positive on biofuels (DfT Senior Policy Officer interview). This was driven, in part, 
by the initial promise of the technology and the lack of many emissions reduction 
initiatives, from elsewhere in Whitehall, for the governments’ planned 2005 Climate 
Change Bill. The pressure on the DfT to throw its weight behind biofuels would also 
have been intensified both by the fact that it was the only sector where emissions were 
on an upward path in the 1990s, and the unattractiveness of alternative ‘solutions’ like 
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reducing speed limits and traffic volume
4
. Accordingly, the aim was to secure 
industry commitment to the technology by providing stable long-term support for 
biofuels, and the RTFO was designed in a way that made it difficult to switch-off 
(unlike duty incentives). As a result, high costs were incurred in terms of the time 
spent constructing the legislation. 
 
By late 2007, as the evidence on deleterious impacts was growing, the RTFO was 
being prepared for its final parliamentary passage in the October, before its 
implementation the following April. The institutional time pressures led to the strong 
sense among decision-makers that the emerging evidence casting doubt on the 
efficacy of biofuels had ‘missed the boat’ (DfT Policy Officer interview), and that any 
revisions would have to come later as the policy matured. Even if there had been 
strong political will to suspend the legislation, achieving this would have been 
logistically impossible for at least its first year given the parliamentary time required 
to rescind legislation. 
 
Decision-makers were also very aware of the sunk costs, in both economic and 
reputational terms, which had been made by the UK government and transport fuels 
industry. Generous duty incentives had been offered since 2002 (for biodiesel) and 
2005 (for bioethanol), and the industry had invested on the assumption that the RTFO 
would come into force. Moreover, it had agreed to a carbon and sustainability (C&S) 
reporting system that offered no guarantees of being the same two years down the line 
when differential rewards through certificates come on stream. This was seen as a 
huge commitment by the industry and a willingness to shoulder its share of the risk 
(Hyman, UK Environmental Industries Commission [EIC] in EAC, 2008). Against 
this backdrop, any radical re-thinking of policy would not only have been legally and 
economically questionable but would also have fatally undermined the DfT’s 
credibility in the fuel sector. 
 
Sunk costs may also be cognitive. This is most clearly seen in the equivocation of key 
environmental stakeholders in response to the evidence of direct and indirect risks of 
biofuels. The 2003 Biofuels Directive enjoyed support from a wide range of policy 
                                                 
4
 I am grateful to one of my referees for stressing these points. 
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stakeholders. Until 2006, environmental NGOs, agricultural lobby and the fuel 
industry endorsed biofuels as the best hope the transport sector had of making a 
meaningful contribution to greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reductions
5
. Against the 
backdrop of this early enthusiasm, environmental NGOs found it difficult to adjust 
their initially positive stance and in the run up to the RTFO’s implementation were 
noticeably unclear on how the government should respond. Such vacillation is 
reflective of that fact that many of these organizations were themselves struggling to 
weigh the risk tradeoffs. For example, the fact that agrifuels can be economically 
beneficial to local communities of the South led to considerable debate within Friends 
of the Earth (FoE) about their position and resulted in a compromise that they should 
not be condemned outright (Griffiths [FoE] in EAC, 2008: Ev48). One effect of this 
was the tacit reinforcement of the government’s position that the RTFO should be 
implemented as per its design. 
 
2.2. Learning by Doing 
The dilemma which all product or policy developers face is gauging when what they 
are making is ‘good enough’ to be released to the market or society. Rather than wait 
for perfection that may never be achieved, the conviction that something can be good 
enough is rooted in the belief that interaction with the world beyond, and adoption by 
others, will make a product or policy improve over time (Rosenberg, 1982). Only 
after this process of maturation, when the appropriate standards for a product or 
activity have been identified, can the main protagonists look back and wish they had 
done things differently (Williamson, 1993). The basis of this logic is the idea of 
experiential learning. Experiential learning – learning by doing – is by far the most 
common form for humans (Mocker and Spear, 1982). Such learning creates snowball 
effects; where the knowledge that is gained from how systems operate will increase 
the future effectiveness of those systems. This is the promise of future gains, where 
inefficiencies found in a policy or technology at its inception can be ironed out 
through implementation and iteration. When it comes to policy, belief in this promise 
serves to ‘lock-in’ decision-makers’ original goals. The conviction that the RTFO 
marked the start of an important learning curve is a strong theme in the government 
reports and interviews. Future decision-makers would use the experiential knowledge 
                                                 
5 On environmentalists’ support for biofuels see the 2004 letter to The Guardian (Thompson et al, 2004) and the June 2005 
‘Bioethanol Declaration’. 
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gained from its implementation to: inform later revisions of the RTFO; take a lead 
role in developing such assurance and train of custody schemes on the international 
stage (DfT Senior Policy Officer interview; industry stakeholder interview), and boost 
the UK’s ability to exploit second, third and fourth generation biofuel technologies
6
. 
 
The attachment to developing policy through experience, where the aim is to 
rationalise contrary evidence within the policy goal (and learning is single-loop), 
pervaded arguments about the establishment of C&S reporting. As evidence filtered 
into government about the deleterious potential of biofuels, and the actual levels of 
carbon savings they create, the fact that the RTFO was coming into force without 
legally enforceable C&S standards was controversial. Taking carbon savings first, the 
government was candid about having revised down its estimates from an expectation 
in 2005 that by 2010 1 million tons per year would be saved to 700,000 tons per year 
(Transport Minister in EAC 2008: Ev111). This uncertainty is linked to the fact that 
carbon calculation is an emerging area of science, too incomplete for levels to be 
linked to any fiscal rewards under the RTFO. Decision-makers’ response to this was 
to begin the process of developing a calculation methodology, able to differentiate 
between the different abatement costs of crops, to be road tested through the reporting 
requirements before it was hard wired into the RTFO in 2010. Their focus was not on 
more fundamental questions about relatively high cost of CO2 reduction implied by 
biofuels. 
 
On sustainability, especially problematic was that information on country of origin 
and land-use change could be recorded as ‘unknown’. Critics argued that inclusion of 
this category meant that the biofuels industry was not incentivised to behave 
sustainably, and data gleaned would be very weak (EAC, 2008). Decision-makers’ 
expectation, however, was that unsustainable behaviour would be rare on two counts. 
First, it was argued that it was very unlikely that very much fuel produced and 
supplied into the UK market would come from land which has been deforested during 
2006 and 2007, making an early UK contribution to deleterious effects unlikely 
                                                 
6 First generation biofuels are made from feedstocks, whose sugars, starch and oils are easily extractable. Second generations 
involve a different bioconversion process, where all forms of biomass can be used. Such processes help avoid the fuel versus 
food dilemma of the first. Third generation fuels, which are the subject of research and development, focus on the source of 
biofuels where the aim is to exploit specially engineered energy crops. Finally, the promise of the fourth generation is that 
production systems can be engineered in which crops capture carbon from the atmosphere before converting this into fuel 
(Biopact, 2007; Harvey, 2009). 
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(Archer, Low Carbon Vehicle Partnership [LCVP] in EAC 2008: Ev85). Second, 
extensive stakeholder consultation and piloting of the scheme suggested that the 
reporting mechanism offered a strong signal to industry to source biofuels that save 
the most carbon because these would be rewarded under future mandatory scheme 
planned for 2011
7
 (Furness, DfT Head of Biofuels in EAC 2008: Ev111). Thus here, 
the tacit knowledge (Polanyi, 1967) that resulted from decision-makers’ relationships 
with fuel producers, and observation of the importance of the shadow of the future in 
the market, were viewed as providing a sufficient counter to emerging evidence of the 
possible countervailing risks created by biofuels. Similarly, the importance of learning 
by doing on data collection was emphasized as a necessity associated with the 
technology, and a virtue of the data capture targets set for the RFA (rising from 50% 
in the first year of the scheme to 90% in the third year). Over the first few years of the 
scheme, the challenge of passing data through the supply chain could be ironed out as 
those chains matured (Archer [LCVP] in EAC 2008: Ev85). 
 
A further line of defence of the reporting arrangements centred upon them as a 
potential model for future mandatory international schemes to manage biofuels 
sustainability (Furness [DfT] in EAC 2008: Ev117). Here learning by doing was 
promoted as an important source of both political and economic advantage. The 
reporting requirements of the RTFO make it the most advanced national scheme for 
managing biofuels’ sustainability and carbon savings, and it was hoped that this 
would enable the UK to play an influential role in the development such standards in 
the forthcoming EU Renewable Energy Directive (CEU, 2008). Economically, UK 
fuel producers and suppliers believed that their detailed knowledge of the 
sustainability issues around biofuels and early commitment to a train of custody 
scheme would leave them well-placed to adjust quickly to the international standards 
that followed from that, and claim first move advantage (Hyman [EIC] in EAC 2008: 
Ev26). 
 
Learning by doing, and the belief that ‘innovation will spur further innovation’ 
(Pierson, 2004: 24), is embedded in the argument that second generation biofuels 
made from non-food materials, thought to be more sustainable than first, will only get 
                                                 
7 This has been superseded by the EU’s Renewable Energy Directive (CEU, 2008). 
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off the ground if a developed market existed – making first generation biofuels an 
essential learning curve (Wenner, Renewable Fuels Agency [REA] in EAC, 2008: 
Ev111). Warnings made in the 2006 Stern Report on Climate Change, about the UK’s 
previous hesitation to commit to renewable technologies, were also influential in the 
belief that innovations must be allowed to mature over time. Waiting for the perfect 
technology in the past explained the UK’s poor performance on renewables (Hilton 
[EIC] in EAC, 2008: Ev26, DfT Senior Policy Officer interview), and on biofuels it 
was already a laggard when compared with its Western European neighbours (Bomb 
et al, 2007). In this way, conceptions of past failures, and the need to learn from 
experience, helped justify the way in which contrary evidence was rationalised and 
the RTFO portrayed as a necessary step on the road toward the UK claiming a 
commercial advantage in more promising and greener technologies. This ‘strategy of 
small losses’ (Sitkin, 1992; see also Wildavsky, 1988 on trial-and-error learning) was 
confirmed by the DfT Head of the Biofuels Programme who was explicit that, in light 
of the emerging evidence of countervailing risks, the promise of the second 
generation fuels serves as main justification for enduring the costs of the first (Furness 
[DfT] in EAC 2008: Ev110-111). 
 
The Gallagher Review similarly rejected calls for a moratorium on biofuels on the 
grounds that it would ‘reduce the ability of the biofuels industry to invest in new 
technologies … [and] ... make it significantly more difficult for the potential of 
biofuels to be realised’ (RFA, 2008: 66). What should be noted about the Gallagher 
intervention, however, is that while they were rejected, the possibility of a moratorium 
or suspension was openly discussed, signaling the potential for deeper policy learning 
in government (RFA, 2008:65-66). 
 
2.3 Coordination Effects 
Coordination effects occur when the benefits that an organization receives from an 
activity increase as others adopt the same behaviour. The benefits are increased and, 
importantly, the drawbacks reduced if they ‘fit’ with the activities of others (Pierson, 
2004: 25). This feature of positive feedback can be seen in the development of the 
RTFO in three particular respects: the increased investment in biofuels in the UK; the 
‘fit’ with the approach of cross-national competitors, and the ‘shadow of hierarchy’ 
(Scharpf, 1997) cast by both the EU and World Trade Organisation (WTO). 
 23 
 
Coordination effects are enhanced where the development of a technology envelopes 
other sectors, creating linked infrastructures. When externalities become networked in 
this way, the economic stakes increase exponentially and lobbies in favour of a policy 
grow. The UK biofuels industry developed alongside the policy. When unfavourable 
evidence began to emerge and filter through via appraisal, this created huge 
disincentives for decision-makers to act in a way that might threaten both the direct 
biofuels industry but also its linked infrastructure. 
 
The use of generous fuel duty incentives in the UK mirrored action in Spain, the 
Netherlands and Sweden (DfT, 2004: s6.5) and there is much evidence of cross-
national lesson drawing in the development of biofuels policy in Europe. DfT officials 
worked particularly closely with their counterparts in the Netherlands and the DG 
Transport and Energy (DG Tren) of the European Commission (CEU), to explore the 
implications of the emerging evidence on biofuels negative impacts (DfT Senior 
Policy Officer interview; Greg Archer LCVP interview). Such mirroring of behaviour 
and close association can foster intersubjective understandings, where policy goals 
become validated and reinforced by peers. 
 
Coordinative effects may also be enforced; the result of commitments made in the 
past or delegation of authority to hierarchy. The hierarchical dimension of political 
life is a very important in the story of UK biofuels policy, where decisions were made 
and appraisals considered in the shadow of the EU and WTO. Taking the EU first, the 
UK is legally obliged to comply with the Biofuels Directive, and so adopted the 
indicative target for 2010 that 5.75% by energy content of transport fuel sales across 
EU should be made up of biofuels. Decision-makers in the DfT were conscious 
throughout the development of the RTFO that they were against the clock and that 
infraction proceedings, which had been escaped in 2004 because of the promise of the 
RTFO, loomed large if the UK failed to meet its obligations (DfT Senior Policy 
Officer interview). Having taken so long to develop the RTFO, decision-makers 
viewed reaching that target as difficult enough, but further delay ‘would risk putting 
us fundamentally at odds with what the Directive requires’ (Furness [DfT] in EAC 
2008: Ev116). This pressure was intensified further in March 2007 when the EU 
agreed the heroic target of 10% by 2020. 
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A further shadow of hierarchy informed the design of policy strategy. The belief that 
the main risk facing the RTFO was the potential for it to become ‘bogged down in 
WTO legal arguments for years and years’ was long-held by decision-makers and 
industry stakeholders (Archer [LCVP] in EAC 2008: Ev85). Accordingly, decision-
makers rejected arguments that criteria being piloted by the Roundtable on 
Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO) could serve as the basis for early mandatory 
sustainability standards, preferring instead to establish a C&S reporting regime which 
included the highly controversial ‘unknown’ category. It was argued that without this, 
the reporting arrangements could be considered a de facto barrier to trade and the 
scheme susceptible to challenge under WTO rules, because it was harder for countries 
of the South to provide evidence on the presence or absence of land-use change 
(E4tech et al, 2005; DfT Policy Officer interview; Archer [LCVP] in EAC 2008: 
Ev85). 
 
The hierarchical dimension of coordinative effects raises important issues about how 
decision-makers order risks. Specifically, what risks they classify as most hazardous. 
In this case, the risks of reforming the RTFO in a manner which contravened either 
EU or WTO obligations were seen as of a much higher order of magnitude than the 
UK’s potential contribution to deleterious impacts of biofuels. Thus, though the UK 
could have reduced targets in the original formulation of the RTFO, it chose not to. 
And, while it was free to impose standards unilaterally, the preference was that this 
should happen Europe-wide. The benefits of coordination mean that the European 
Commission would shoulder the risk, and be liable for any challenge if any of the 
standards set were believed to be incompatible with WTO rules (Furness [DfT] in 
EAC 2008: Ev122). 
 
Gallagher’s intervention, and the government’s response to it, signalled a change in 
tone regarding how deferential decision-makers were to the targets impose from 
above. Specifically, the UK’s move to scaling back its own targets and push debate 
further in the EU on the suitability of the 10% by 2020 suggest an openness to 
internal, if not radical, change that had not existed in the run-up to the RTFO’s 
implementation. 
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2.4. Adaptive Expectations 
Just as business organizations are under pressure to ‘pick the right horse’ (Pierson, 
2004: 24), decision-makers addressing urgent policy problems must address goals and 
select strategies, that can command broad acceptance. Such decisions are made taking 
into account the best evidence, that is available at the time. Once established, the 
positive expectations associated with a policy become self-fulfilling as they breed 
investment – notably economic, political and cognitive – which feeds back positively 
to the policy. In such circumstances, evidence that questions the wisdom in such 
extensive investment should be expected to meet substantial resistance. This was the 
case in biofuels. As one policymaker put it, had the full reach of the deleterious 
effects of biofuels had been known at the outset, while the UK would have developed 
a policy to develop biofuels, it would probably not have been an obligation based one 
(DfT Senior Policy Officer interview). By 2007, as the signals of countervailing risks 
intensified, it was thought to be ‘too late’ for the UK to reconsider. The political, 
material and cognitive costs of policy suspension, let alone termination or reversal, 
were simply too high. 
 
The collective nature of politics is important to how expectations about a policy 
develop and are reproduced: actors change their actions in light of expectations about 
how others will act (Pierson, 2004: 25, 33). EU targets, rather than independent 
market demand, were the impetus for UK biofuels policy. This left the DfT needing to 
foster the development of an industry as well as a policy (DfT Policy Officer 
interview). In the early days of policy development, the DfT worked hard to bring fuel 
stakeholders on board. It was argued that the sector’s responsibility for a quarter of 
UK GHG emissions and the dearth of renewable technologies from which to choose 
meant the transport sector had to embrace the best technology on offer. In 2003, this 
was biofuels. As the RTFO developed, so the renewable fuel lobby became more 
established and united, and industry behaviour changed. While the DfT was far from 
captured by these actors, they did represent an important source of institutional 
friction (Olson, 1981). This made it unlikely that policy appraisal evidence pointing to 
reduced GHG emissions savings, and harmful effects of biofuels, would precipitate 
dramatic policy change. Industry had contributed significantly to the design of the 
RTFO, and invested heavily in changing their practices, in readiness for its 
implementation (Hyman [EIC] in EAC 2008: Ev21). This political authority was 
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arguably enhanced by the fragmented and uncertain response of the environmental 
stakeholders and made the RTFO’s passage inevitable (see section 2.1). 
 
Decision-makers’ expectations were also influenced by the ways in which other 
governments were responding to the evidence on biofuels. This links to the 
intersubjective understandings that are fostered by policy officers discussing how to 
address the unintended consequences of biofuels, with their contemporaries in other 
states (see section 2.3). It also has an economic dimension. The economic returns 
around biofuels would still increase even if the UK had abandoned the RTFO entirely. 
Decision-makers and industry stakeholders were especially conscious that schemes 
already set-up in the Netherlands and Germany were less stringent than the proposed 
RTFO (Wenner [REA] in EAC 2008: Ev23-24, National Farmers’ Union [NFU] in 
EAC 2008: Ev67), and if UK standards were set too high this could stymie the growth 
of the industry, and hand a competitive advantage to another country. 
 
Post-Gallagher, decision-makers’ interpretation of the flexibility of the targets 
changed. The review convinced decision-makers they could revisit and adjust their 
targets, because the weight of evidence was such that their European partners would 
make similar moves. While the slowdown has been criticised as both too modest, and 
as sending out the wrong signal to the nascent industry, in terms of learning it is 
symptomatic of the freer thinking and understanding of choice than was in evidence 
pre-Gallagher. 
CONCLUSIONS 
This paper is concerned with the analysis of policy appraisal systems and, in 
particular, the depth of learning they can stimulate in relation to complex and urgent 
policy problems. Analysis suggests the usefulness of accounts that attend to the 
temporal tensions that exist between policy and knowledge development. The case 
study findings illustrate the proposition that, where policy and knowledge 
development timetables are out of synch, existing technical, procedural and cognitive 
rules of the game can condition the interpretation of findings from the policy 
appraisals, in ways that inhibit deep learning. Evidence throw up by appraisals on 
countervailing risks can be too conjectural, or unclear, to force decision-makers to 
reconsider the premises on which policy is based, and engage in deep forms of 
learning, in the time available to them. The biofuels case is underscored by the sense 
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that the appearance of evidence lagged too far behind policy development to trigger 
any fundamental re-thinking. 
 
What have we learned about the relative importance of each of the four feedback 
mechanisms? In this case, two orders of feedback existed. The first order is the 
coordinative effects of the multilevel and hierarchical context, within which UK 
biofuels policy was developed, which created particularly intense feedback. The 
shadows of hierarchy cast by the EU and, to a lesser extent the WTO, conditioned 
decision-makers’ understandings of ‘the boundaries of the possible’ (Majone, 1989) 
on biofuels. The result was a context favourable to second order mechanisms that 
operated at the domestic level. In response to EU pressure, and anticipated WTO 
sanctions, significant costs were sunk into biofuels resulting in resource distributions 
that reinforced a bias toward adjustive or ‘single-loop’ learning processes. Dissonant 
information was rationalised away, with the promise of ‘learning by doing’, and the 
perception that it was ‘too late’ to reconsider became policymakers’ accepted mantra. 
 
That two orders of feedback were identified, operating at two levels of decision-
making, has significance beyond the biofuels case. Action on climate change needs to 
be coordinated at the supranational level. However, the biofuels example illustrates 
that one of the risks of such collective action is the inability for states to engage fully 
with the results of the policy appraisals they conduct. Attenuating this risk is further 
complicated by the speed with which path dependent processes appear able to become 
established around the governance of new sustainability technologies. These concerns 
must, of course, be tempered by the fact that this case, and indeed climate change 
governance as a whole, is very much a moving target. It is quite conceivable that 
decision-makers involved in initiatives such as the RTFO will apply lessons learned in 
this instance to future iterations of biofuels policy, and to similarly complex 
technologies. 
 
The value of using analytical insights from NIE to explain how appraisal evidence 
was interpreted is that it offers a political account focussed on the behaviour of the 
decision-makers at the heart of policymaking. This eschews functional arguments that 
assume a level of rationality that simply does not exist when the issues at stake are 
complex, knowledge-dense and urgent (Pierson, 2004: 46). That decision-makers’ 
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interpretations are mediated by paths they do not entirely choose or control, reducing 
their ability and desire to engage in deep learning, does not mean however that the 
outlook for appraisal is bleak. Recall Weiss’s famous advice to evaluation researchers 
not to be overwhelmed by knowledge of political constraints, but rather to treat them 
as ‘a precondition for useable evaluation research’ (1987: 48). The aim here is the 
same. The main useable insight into the policy and politics of policy appraisal 
generated concerns the measures that can be taken to enable decision-makers to learn 
how to engage in different depths of learning. The biofuels case highlights both an 
additional appraisal procedure, and government actor, that may help facilitate such 
‘deutero-learning’ (Argyris and Schön, 1974, 1978). 
 
The first is that deeper learning may result from reviews of policy appraisal conducted 
by ‘knowledge brokers’ (Litfin, 1994; Sabatier, 1988) located beyond the immediate 
circle of government. The biofuels case brings into relief the confusion that appraisal 
processes may create, and illustrates that policy appraisal does not always result in 
consensus or coincide with a period of normal science. By commissioning research, 
and inviting views, on the RTFO a wealth of uncertainties were uncovered. However, 
while learning throughout was single-loop, important differences in the style of 
government learning between the first and second phase of appraisal were detected. 
These suggest that appraisals that are conducted in the public eye and beyond the 
immediate circle of government may enable moves toward enhanced learning. In the 
absence of any consensus as a North Star with which decision-makers can orient 
themselves to the epistemic constellations around biofuels, Gallagher’s intervention 
allowed them to step back from the issue and reflect upon the interpretations that had 
become locked-in during the RTFO’s development. These small changes in tone may 
appear to be but trifles, but their importance is potentially huge. Following the path 
dependence logic, once established, policies are difficult to change. Gallagher-style 
reviews conducted by ‘critical friends’, trusted by government, represent an additional 
appraisal form that may help decision-makers make tentative steps off sub-optimal 
paths. 
 
The need to have a second appraisal should not be taken as evidence that the first 
phase was ineffective. On the contrary, the biofuels case illustrates that the 
endarkened state that existed by 2007 represented an opportunity as much as a threat 
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to policy. The wider reflection, and enhanced learning, that resulted from the 
Gallagher review would not have been possible without the confusion generated by 
the earlier appraisal processes. 
 
The second practical insight concerns the question of who are best placed to trigger 
such reflective processes. Enhanced types of learning are costly – while positive 
feedback allows inefficient policies to survive, the disruptive nature of double-loop 
learning means that it cannot be encouraged in all cases where the consequence 
appears to jar with the objective. In the biofuels case, Chief Scientific Advisers 
(CSAs) within government departments emerged important catalysts for the Gallagher 
review. The role of these actors, and their interventions in policy appraisal processes, 
warrants further research. Their unique professional position, spanning the boundary 
between science and politics, may give them the right blend of epistemic credibility 
and political authority for their advice to be trusted on when model II learning should 
be initiated. 
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